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THE VIDEO REVOLUTION AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT: DEMOCRATIZATION OF
MEDIA PRODUCTION AND PUBLIC ACCESS TO THE
FUTURE "ELECTRONIC PUBLIC FORUM"
I. INTRODUCTION
This Note will examine new and emerging first amendment issues
pertaining to certain technological developments in electronic mass media.
The developments include the advent of the low-cost video camcorder and
the increasing number of very high channel capacity cable television
systems with provisions for public access. The effect of these
developments is to remove historic barriers to the production and
distribution of electronic mass media, thereby placing the most powerful
means of mass communications within the reach of a substantial portion
of the population. As mightbe expected, a structural change of this
magnitude will have broad legal ramifications, including, most
significantly, a need to reconsider the scope of application of the first
amendment.
The first part of this Note considers new and emerging first
amendment issues pertaining to video production by non-professionals and
freelancers with specific reference to electronic newsgathering. The
second part considers new and emerging first amendment issues pertaining
to the distribution of non-professional video works by cable television
public access channels. ' The Note will conclude with a set of
recommendations aimed at encouraging the broadest possible
diversification of the production and distribution of electronic mass media.
The recommendations will attempt to extend established first amendment
principles to a rapidly changing media environment.
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II. FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUES PERTAINING TO VIDEO PRODUCTION
BY NON-PROFESSIONALS AND FREELANCERS
A. Overview: Growth of Non-Professional
Video Production
1. Equipment Sales: Trends and Projections
The video camcorder, virtually unknown five years ago, is
currently found in ten percent of American households. 1 In each year
since 1985, annual sales have increased dramatically: 1989 estimated sales
of 2.3 million units for example, were fifteen percent ahead of the
previous year.2 With the cost and size of camcorders continuing to drop,
double-digit year-to-year sales increases are expected to continue.3 While
the ultimate United States market for camcorders is impossible to predict,
it is worth noting that the videocassette recorder, a similarly successful
and technologically related innovation,' is now found in sixty-eight
percent of American homes.' The television monitor, the exhibition
monitor for camcorder tapes, is currently found in ninety-eight percent of
American homes.'
1. ELECTRONIC INDUSTRIES ASS'N CONSUMER ELECTRONIC GROUP, CONSUMER
ELECTRONICS U.S. SALES 24 (Jan. 1990) [hereinafter ELECTRONIC INDUSTRIES AW5'N].
2. Id. at 8.
3. McGill, Camcorders Spread Video's Power, N.Y. Times, June26, 1989, at D1,
col. 1.
4. The videocassette recorder (VCR) was designed initially as a means to record and
play back broadcast or cablecast material and as a means to play back pre-recorded
commercially-produced videotape. Waterman, Prerecorded Home Video and the
Distribution of Theatrical Feature Fibns, in VIDEO MEDIA COMPETITION: REGULATION,
ECONOMIcs, AND TECHNOLOGY (E. Noam ed. 1985). With the advent of the
camcorder, the VCR has assumed a third function: playback of videotape initially
recorded on a camcorder. It is important to note that those households that do not
possess a camcorder but do possess a VCR can play back a videotape produced by a
camcorder, i.e., a tape that was neither produced nor distributed through normal
commercial channels. McGill, supra note 3, at D7, col. 1.
5. ELECTRONIC INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION, supra note 1, at 8.
6. See BROADCASTINO/CABLECASTING YEARBOOK G-16 (1990).
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2. Economics of Video Production
In one sense, the camcorder is merely the latest technological
development in the century-old tradition of amateur photography.' The
camcorder, as is the case with the amateur still camera and the home
movie camera, is used primarily to record family, friends and vacation
travel.' Therefore, it may be presumed that the continued recording of
these activities by electronic rather than electro-mechanical means would
have only an incremental effect on social and political concerns, and on
overarching legal questions such as the scope of application of the first
amendment.9 Yet events from around the world already have proved
otherwise.1" In fact, the camcorder appears to be more than a mere
technological refinement of previous methods of amateur photography.
In order to understand why this is so, it is necessary first to comprehend
the fundamental technological differences between videotape and motion
picture film.
Blank amateur videotape stock costs between $10 and $20 per
hour of stock; unexposed amateur motion picture film stock costs between
$100 and $200 per hour of stock."1 Images on videotape may be
retrieved and exhibited at no additional cost and with no delay; images on
motion picture film must be subjected to a chemical process, commonly
known as development, generally available only through a motion picture
laboratory and at an additional cost of between $250 and $750 per hour
of film." Images on videotape may be erased and the tape stock re-
used; motion picture film stock, once exposed to light and developed, is
not re-usable. Videotape may be copied by means of equipment already
widely available in the home (i. e., video cassette recorders) and at a net
cost of the blank videotape stock used to make the copy ($10 to $20 per
hour of stock);" motion picture film stock may be copied generally only
at motion picture laboratories at a cost of between $250 and $750 per
7. McGill, supra note 3.
8. Id.
9. Id. at D7, col. 5.
10. See infra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
11. EASTMAN KODAK Co., MOTION PICTURE AND AUDIOVISUAL PRODUCTS
DIviSION PRICE SCHEDULE (1989) [hereinafter EASTMAN KODAK CO.].
12. See, e.g., ASSOCIATION OF CINEMA AND VIDEO LABORATORIES, ACVL
HANDBOOK (1988); see also DUART FILM LABORATORIES, INC., PRICE LIST 1989
[hereinafter DUART FILM LABS].
13. EASTMAN KODAK Co., supra note 11, at 1.
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hour of film. 4 Videotape may be exhibited using equipment already
widely available in the home (i.e., television monitors and videocassette
recorders); motion picture film may be exhibited using equipment that is
often not widely available (i.e., motion picture projectors).
The cumulative effect of these technological differences between
videotape and motion picture film leads inexorably to a stark comparison
of cost between the two media: the variable cost of recording an extra
hour of videotape, after the fixed cost of equipment rental or purchase has
been paid, can be as low as zero; the variable cost of shooting an extra
hour of motion picture film can be $1,000 or more.
An equally important effect of the technological differences
between videotape and motion picture film relates to matters of relative
convenience and control. Videotape can be handled, distributed and
viewed privately." No third party need be involved in the post-
production or exhibition of video work. Produced and distributed in this
fashion, video work is uncensorable.' 6
Videotape and videography have existed since the mid 1950's.17
Yet, until the mid-1980's, video production equipment was expensive,
bulky, difficult to use and subject to intensive maintenance and servicing
costs.' 8  Camcorders, by contrast, may soon cost as little as $500,
literally fit into the palm of one's hand and can be operated by people
who possess little or no technical knowledge. 9
In sum, camcorder and video technology allow anyone to record
almost an unlimited amount of material at very little cost with total control
over the production, copying and distribution of the work.' Camcorder
and video technology represents a qualitative break with the previous
14. DUART FILM LABS, supra note 12, at 2.
15. The Koppel Report: Television: Revolution in a Box (ABC television broadcast,
Sept. 13, 1989) (transcript available from Journal Graphics, Inc.) [hereinafter The
Koppel Report: Television: Revolution in a Box].
16. Id.
17. See generally K. MARSH, INDEPENDENT VIDEO (1974).
18. See, e.g., N. HELLER, UNDERSTANDING VIDEO EQUIPMENT (1989); G.
MILLERSON, VIDEO PRODUCTION HANDBOOK (1987); B. WINSTON & J. KEYDEL,
WORKING WITH VIDEO (1986).
19. McGill, supra note 3.
20. The Koppel Report: Television: Revolution in a Box, supra note 15, at 5-6.
260 [Vol. VIII
1990] NOTES 261
technology of amateur motion picture photography2" and holds the
promise of making technically possible the large-scale democratization of
mass media.
3. Early Effects of Non-Professional Video
Production on Social and Political Institutions:
United States and Worldwide
The effect of camcorders and related video technology on social
and political institutions, while as yet relatively insignificant in the United
States,' already has been deeply felt in certain other nations.' In
Poland, a videographer associated with Solidarity has stated: "A $5 video
cassette has done more than the whole army did. It was stronger than
them."' Lech Walesa, the Polish leader, has stated that without video
and related technology, the 1980's Solidarity labor and political movement
would have been lost.' In Chile, one commentator describes the
process by which anti-government video is produced and distributed:
This footage was made with a camcorder at the national
university of Chile. [It shows] a woman student,
allegedly shot by the Chilean police .... The program
is distributed to 300 subscribers, churches, human rights
organizations. Each cassette is copied, then copied
again, until eventually, its producers claim, it reaches an
audience of 40,000 to 50,000 a month.'
21. Amateur motion picture film technology developed in the 1960's and 1970's
allowed a large number of non-professionals access to the motion picture medium. See,
e.g., E. PiNcus & S. AscRER, THE FmMMAKER's HANDBOOK (1984); L. LIPTON,
INDEPENDENT FILMMAKINO (1983); R. NoRRIS, THE COMPLETE BOOK OF SUPER 8
FILMMAKINO (1982).
22. The Koppel Report: Television: Revolution in a Box, supra note 15, at 9-10.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 6.
25. Id. at 5. In light of the apparently significant role of video technology in the
democratic movements of Eastern Europe, it is not surprising that the recently installed
Soviet puppet government of Lithuania outlawed the mere possession of video cameras.
See Keller, Soviet Loyalists in Charge After Attack on Lithuania, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14,
1991, at Al, col. 6 (the criminalization of possession, as distinct from the selective or
total proscription of use, suggests that video technology has been recognized by at least
one authoritarian government to be as inherently dangerous as firearms).
26. Id.
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Camcorders and related video technology also are being used extensively
by anti-government groups in China, South Africa and Israel.'
In the United States, the most significant use of camcorders by
amateurs has been to record incidents involving violence or other
confrontations between police and political protestors.2 In one of the
most celebrated recent cases, several amateur videographers recorded a
political demonstration in New York City's Tompkins Square Park, during
which a number of police beat the protestors with nightsticks. 9 In the
wake of this and other similar incidents, a commentator has noted that
police conduct during demonstrations is already being affected by the
seemingly ubiquitous presence of camcorders.'
More generally, the widespread non-professional" use of the
camcorder in the United States is beginning to affect how local television
stations gather the news.32 One station news director has stated:
"Having people who are not a part of your regular news staff... supply
you with news material . . . [is] simply taking the old idea of the news
stringer and marrying it to the realization . that there is an awful lot
of home video equipment out there."33
The increasing reliance by television stations on news footage
recorded by non-professional and freelance' videographers raises
important issues with respect to the first amendment. 5 Two key issues -
governmentally authorized access to breaking news events and so-called
media shield laws - provide the basis for discussion in Parts IB and IC of
27. McGill, supra note 3, at D7, col. 3; see also Making News/Making History:
Live from Tiananmen Square, Breaking the Ban: Recent Images from South Africa
(catalogue of 1989 American Film Institute Video Festival); The Revolution Will be
Televised: Video Documents from Popular Movements in Asia (catalog of Video
Witnesses: Festival of New Journalism (1990)).
28. Lieberman, Home Video is Capturing More Disputed Police Actions on Tape,
L.A. Times, Oct. 11, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
29. Id. at A23, col. 2.
30. Id. at A23, col. 4.
31. For the purposes of this Note, a "non-professional" videographeris defined as
one whose primary purpose in using videotape is for other than pecuniary gain.
32. The Koppel Report: Television: Revolution in a Box, supra note 13, at 2-3.
33. Id.
34. For the purposes of this Note, a "freelance" videographer is defined as one
whose primary purpose in using videotape is for pecuniary gain and who has an
employment or other close contractual relationship with an established news, broadcast,
cable or similar organization.
35. See infra notes 36-78 and accompanying text.
[Vol. VIII
1990] NOTES 263
this Note.
B. The Non-Professional/Freelance Videographer
and Government Authorized Access to Places
In some contexts and jurisdictions, the right of access of the
organized press to events and government property is the same as that of
the general public.' In other contexts government makes a distinction
between the access privileges of the organized press and that of the
general public, and accords special privileges to the press.37 In the latter
contexts, how the government defines organized press becomes the crucial
element as to whether video freelancers and non-professionals may obtain
access to an event, such as a crime scene or disaster area, or to a non-
public forum property,3" such as a courthouse or prison. This section
reviews representative statutes and case law in an effort to identify
potential legal strategies by which video freelancers and non-professionals
may take advantage of the special access privileges accorded to the
organized press.
1. Access to Emergency Scenes on
Public Property
In Branzburg v. Hayes,39 the United States Supreme Court stated
in dictum that journalists "have no constitutional right of access to the
scenes of crimes or disasters when the general public is excluded."'
However, in many jurisdictions the organized press have been granted
36. For example, events taking place in public fora, excluding emergency scenes.
Under normal circumstances, access by journalists and non-journalists to public fora
would be identical. See Access to Places, NEWS MEDIA & L., Summer 1989, at 2, 2-3
[hereinafter Access to Places].
37. The most common example is government-issued press passes. See infra notes
39-52 and accompanying text.
38. Non-public forum government property is generally property not held open to
the public for assembly, communication and discussion. See Hague v. Committee for
Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 514 (1939).
39. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
40. Id. at 684-85. The Court also states that "it is [not] suggested that
newsgathering does not qualify for First Amendment protection; without some protection
for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated." Id. at 681 (yet the
right to "gather" news - and precisely who is entitled to practice this right - has never
been delineated by the Court).
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certain special access privileges to emergency scenes by statute,4'
ordinance or administrative fiat. 2 Such access privileges, commonly in
the form of government-issued "press passes," are generally accorded
only to employees of established news organizations and to the exclusion
of freelance and non-professional journalists.'
One court has recognized protections against arbitrary exclusion
of some journalists from the benefits of special access privileges." In
Sherrill v. Knight,' the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit held that if a government agency establishes a policy
of permitting access to journalists, such access "cannot be denied
arbitrarily or for less than compelling reasons."" The court also held
that the agency must publish standards that will be used in determining
whether an applicant is eligible for press access privileges.47 Applicants
who are denied access privileges are accorded due process rights with
respect to the reason for the denial and the opportunity for judicial
review." The court based its determination upon the free press clause
of the first amendment providing a "liberty interest" sufficient to invoke
the protection of the due process clause of the fifth amendment.49
Since Sherrill did not turn on whether or not the applicant for
special access privileges was a bona fide journalist,' its result may not
be construed as a judicial endorsement of the rights of freelancers and
non-professionals to obtain government-authorized access privileges.,
Nevertheless, Sherrill does establish a benchmark due process requirement
governing the allocation of access privileges. 2
41. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 409.5(d) (West Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2917.13(B) (Anderson 1982).
42. "Press passes" and "press guidelines" often are issued by local police
departments outside of the formal regulatory process. See Access to Places, supra note
36, at 8-9.
43. Id. (such access privileges are commonly in the form of government-issued
"press passes").
44. See Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
45. 569 F.2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
46. Id. at 130.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 130-31.
50. Id. at 129.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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2. Access to Non-Public ForumGovernment Property
Public streets, sidewalks and parks have long been considered
public fora, in which government restrictions on speech and other forms
of communication are subject to heightened judicial scrutiny. 53 In the
absence of governmental restrictions on a public forum (e.g., temporary
governmental limitations on access to a crime scene or disaster area), a
journalist's right of access to a public forum is the same as that of the
general public.'
Government office buildings, courthouses and prisons are not
usually open to public use and thus are not deemed to be public fora. 55
Journalists seeking access to these places frequently must secure special
access privileges in the same manner as those seeking access to
emergency scenes on public-forum property.'
A recent case decided by the Eleventh Circuit represents a setback
for freelance and non-professional videographers seeking access privileges
to non-public forum government property. 7  In Jersawitz v.
Hanberry,5s the court held that the Federal Bureau of Prisons could deny
an independent video producer access to a maximum security prison
because the producer was not an employee of an established broadcast
news organization." The court based its decision on prior Supreme
Court cases holding that journalists have no special first amendment right
of access to prisons or inmates. °  Finding no constitutional rights
53. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989); Members
of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984); United States v. Grace,
461 U.S. 171 (1983); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Madison School Dist.
v. Wisconsin Employee Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976); Southeastern
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975); Shuttleworth v. City of Birmingham,
394 U.S. 147 (1969); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1969); Adderly v.
Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Hague v. CIO,
307 U.S. 496 (1939).
54. See Access to Places, supra note 36, at 4.
55. See, e.g., Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974); PeU v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
56. See Access to Places, supra note 36, at 4.
57. Jersawitz v. Hanberry, 610 F. Supp. 535 (N.D. Ga. 1985), affid, 783 F.2d
1532 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986).
58. Id.
-59. Jersawitz, 783 F.2d at 1535.
60. Id. at 1534 (citing Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 894; Pell, 417 U.S. at 834).
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implicated, the court applied rational basis analysis to the plaintiff's equal
protection claims and held that the Bureau of Prisons' regulation is
rationally related to "the obvious need to maintain security and order in
the prison."16
Since Jersawitz relies on Supreme Court decisions that specifically
deny journalists a special right of access to prisons, 62 it may be argued
that its holding with respect to the rights of freelance and non-professional
journalists should be narrowly construed. Judicial deference to the
interests of prison administrators in maintaining order and security may
not necessarily extend to other non-public forum government property.
61
C. The Non-Professional/Freelance Videographer and
the Newsgatherer's Nondisclosure Privilege
Two recent incidents illustrate the difficulties encountered by
freelance and non-professional videographers when confronted with
subpoenas or other official demands for their work products.' In a case
arising out of allegations of police brutality in response to demonstrations
in New York City's Tompkins Square Park, a non-professional
videographer who refused to turn over a videotape of the melee was jailed
for 16 days.' The videographer subsequently agreed to hand over the
tape.' In San Jose, California, two student videographers who recorded
a police shoot-out in which two officers died were compelled to turn over
the tape to the police within minutes after the shooting incident was
over.67 The stated reason for the confiscation was that the tape was
61. Id.
62. Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 843; Pell, 417 U.S. at 817..
63. For example, the Supreme Court has found a constitutional right of access to
criminal judicial proceedings. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555
(1980). Discrimination among media employees, freelancers and non-professionals in
this context - absent a compelling state interest - could be expected to yield a different
result. Id. at 578.
64. The incidence of subpoenas being served on newsgatherers appears to be quite
common. Sherer, A Survey of Photojournalists and Their Encounters with the Law, 64
JOURNALISM Q. 499, 501 (1987) (in one survey of news photographers, over 25% of
respondents said that they had received a subpoena).
65. Hays, Artist Surrenders Videotape of Clash in Tompkins Square, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 17, 1988, at 30, col. 5.
66. Id.
67. Cops Confiscate Student Video of Shoot-out, NEWS MEDIA & L., Spring 1989,
at 12.
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needed by the police "for their investigation."" Later, the police
acknowledged that they might have acted differently if the students had
been professional journalists.'
Most states recognize the newsgatherer's non-disclosure privilege,
but such privilege is generally accorded only to persons "employed by"
or "connected with" established news organizations.' Thus, in these
states the privilege would not extend to freelance or non-professional
videographers gathering material in the hope of selling it to an established
news organization. 1
At least five state statutes do provide some degree of protection
to freelance or non-professional newsgatherers who do not have a formal
connection to a news organization at the time that the reporting or
photographing takes place.' For example, Nebraska's statute extends
to any person "engaged in procuring, gathering, writing, editing or
disseminating news or other information."' By contrast, California's
statute extends only to newsgatherers "connected with a newspaper,
magazine, radio or television station or press association."74
As noted above, courts in states with limited or no statutory
privilege have been willing to establish privilege based upon constitutional
or common law principles.75 In an important case for freelance
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. A 1987 survey found that the non-disclosure privilege was recognized in 35
states. Confidential Sources & Information: A Practical Guide for Reporters in the Fifly
States, NEWS MEDIA & L., Fall 1987, at 2, 2-12 [hereinafter Confidential Sources &
Information]. Recognition was by statute in 26 states (commonly known as "shield
laws") and by judicial invocation of constitutional or common law in the remaining nine
states. Id. The survey also found that the scope of the privilege varied considerably,
from absolute, e.g., New York, to conditional, depending upon such factors as whether
the evidence is available through alternate means or whether the subpoenaed material has
been published. Id.
71. Id. at 10-12; see also Sherer, Freelance Photojournalists and the Law, 10
COMM. & L. 39, 41 (1988).
72. Confidential Sources & Information, supra note 70, at 10-12.
73. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-144, 20-147 (1987).
74. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1070 (Deering Supp. 1990).
75. The Supreme Court's ambiguous holding in Branzburg v. Hayes has created
some confusion with respect to the constitutional basis of the newsgatherer's non-
disclosure privilege. In a 5-4 opinion, the Branzburg Court held that reporters are not
privileged to refuse to appear before grand juries and answer all questions. 408 U.S.
665, 690 (1972). But the court also noted that "without some protection for seeking out
the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated." Id. at 681. A concurring opinion
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filmmakers and videographers, the Tenth Circuit permitted a documentary
filmmaker to claim a constitutional privilege in a civil matter even though
the filmmaker had no connection to an established news organization.7'
The court noted that the filmmaker spent "considerable time and effort in
obtaining facts and information of the subject matter in this lawsuit,"'
and that "his intention .. .was to make use of [the material] in the
preparation of the film."78
Such an expansive view of a constitutionally-based non-disclosure
privilege and its qualified protection of freelancers and non-professionals
may hold promise of further application in a time of increasing numbers
of freelance and non-professional videographers recording important and
newsworthy events. Alternately, such protection can be extended by
statute, as is already the case in five states.'
III. FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUES PERTAINING TO DISTRIBUTION
OF NON-PROFESSIONAL VIDEO WORKS BY CABLE PUBLIC
AccEsS CHANNELS
A. Overview: Growth of Cable Public Access Channel
Beginning in the early 1970's, commentators have looked to cable
television as the means to overcome the limited diversity in traditional
broadcast programming. ' Today it may be argued that, with the notable
exception of public access channels"1 and certain other programming,'
by Justice Powell explicitly recognized a qualified privilege as did the four Justices who
dissented. Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 712 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id.
at 728 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
76. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977).
77. Id. at 436-37.
78. Id..at 437 (emphasis added).
79. ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320-4325
(1974); MICH. COM. LAWS ANN. § 767.5(a) (West Supp. 1987); NEB. REV. STAT. §§
20-144 to -147 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (1980).
80. See, e.g., SLOAN COMMISSION ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, ON THE CABLE:
THE TELEVISION OF ABUNDANCE (1971); R. SMITH, THE WIRED NATION (1972).
Today there are 9,300 operating cable television systems in the United States, serving
some 25,000 communities. BROADCASTINO/CABLECASTINO YEARBOOK D-3 (1989).
Cable systems currently reach an estimated 130 million people, or 53% of the nation's
households with television sets. Id.
81. See SECTION IIID, infra notes 162-94 and accompanying text.
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much of cable programming differs little from standard commercial
broadcasting fare.' Yet even the most pessimistic observers would
concede that the large and ever-growing amount of "channel space"
necessarily will effectuate some transformation in the quality and diversity
of telecommunications. If this be doubted, one need only consider that
the number of available programming hours in a 70-channel cable
systemu exceeds by 1,000 percent the maximum number of
programming hours collectively available through conventional VHF
broadcast television. In short, the increasing number of very high channel
capacity cable television systems represents an unprecedented opportunity
to implement the key first amendment value of diversity of expressions
with respect to this most powerful of communications media.
To the present the cable medium has already given rise to a
radical new form of television generally known as "public access."'
Less than twenty-five years old," the public access concept provides for
the dedication of one or more channels for the use of any person on a
non-discriminatory, first-come, first-serve basis. 8 The cable system
operator is generally barred from controlling the editorial content of these
channels.'
Public access channels and production facilities have experienced
extraordinary growth in recent years.' In 1976, less than 100 such
82. Notably the Cable-Satellite Public Affairs Network (CSPAN) and the Cable
News Network (CNN).
83. See, e.g., K. BECK, CULTIVATING THE WASTELAND: CAN CABLE PUT THE
VISION BACK IN TV? (1983).
84. See Brown, MSO Appetites for More Bandwidth Signals '87 Surge is Setting
Pace for '88, CABLEVISION, Sept. 14, 1987, at 44 (such a system will become
increasingly common in the future).
85. The first amendment "rests on the assumption that the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the
welfare of the public .... Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
86. Public access is also known as community access or community television.
Public access was established in the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, an
explicit federal statutory mandate for public use. 47 U.S.C. § 531 (1988).
87. One of the first government-mandated public access channels was established
as part of the Manhattan cable franchises awarded by the New York City Board of
Estimate in 1970. Buske, The Development of Connunity Television, 9 COMMUNITY
TELEVISION REV. 12, 12 (1986).
88. See, e.g., J. GOODALE, ALL ABOUT CABLE: LEGAL AND BUSINESS AsPECTs
OF CABLE AND PAY TELEVISION (rev. ed. 1988).
89. Id. at 6-29 to 6-32.
90. Buske, supranote 87, at 13.
1990]
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facilities exited in the United States.9' Ten years later there were over
1,200 facilities offering an estimated 40,000 hours of new programming
each week.' Of the 130 million people in the United States now
reached by cable television, almost 40 percent are reported to be viewers
of cable public access programming.9
Prospects for future growth of public access cable television
depend to some extent on the resolution of legal matters to be discussed
infra9 and to some extent on continuing capital investment by the cable
industry. With respect to the latter concern, it is notable that the average
cable system currently contains 35 channels but that almost all new or
rebuilt cable systems will contain approximately 70 channels.95 In a 70-
channel system the relatively lower marginal economic value of a channel
would increase the probability that the system would contain at least one
public access channel.
B. The Question of Constitutionality of
Government-Mandated Cable Television
Public Access Channels
To some commentators, cable public access channels would
appear to be the very embodiment of the important first amendment value
of "diversity of expression" as applied to the medium of television.'
91. Id.
92. Id.; see also Stoney, Public Access: A Word About Pioneers, 9 CoMMUNITY
TELEVISION REV. 7, 7 (1986).
93. Kiernan, To Watch is O.K., but to Air is Divine, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP.,
Oct. 16, 1989, at 112, 112.
94. Legal matters awaiting judicial resolution are discussed in SECTIONS IIB, IIC
and lID, infra notes 97-194 and accompanying text; legal matters subject to legislative
resolution are discussed in SECTION lIE, infra notes 195-210 and accompanying text.
95. Brown, supra note 84, at 48. In 1988, the cable industry spent over $1.6
billion installing over 40,000 miles of new and rebuilt cable systems. Dawson, $1.7
Billion in Construction Forecast in Perplexing Boom, CABLEVISION, Mar. 27, 1989, at
30.
96. See generally Caristi, Right to Media Access, 22 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 103
(1988); Mininberg, Circumstances Within Our Control Promoting Freedom of
Expression Through Cable Television, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 551 (1984); Note,
Expanding the Scarcity Rationale: The Constitutionality of Public Access Requirements
in Cable Franchise Agreements, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 305 (1986).
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Yet paradoxically it is the same first amendment that continues to cloud
the future of cable public access.'
The brief history of government-mandated cable public access has
been a protracted constitutional struggle over the question of whose first
amendment rights are superior: the cable operator's or the public's."
In 1972, the Federal Communications Commission issued rules that
required most cable operators to upgrade their cable systems, expand the
number of channels, and set aside a number of these channels for access
purposes." In 1979, the Supreme Court invalidated these rules on
statutory rather than constitutional grounds. 1" In 1984 Congress
provided an explicit federal statutory basis for cable public access."' 1
In 1986 the Supreme Court held that the activities of cable television
operators "plainly implicate first amendment interests,""0 2 but declined
to further delineate these interests A3 As a result, the lower federal
courts, bereft of clear guidance on this complex matter of constitutional
law, have issued broadly inconsistent decisions with respect to the validity
of government-mandated cable public access."
97. See infra notes 124-61 and accompanying text.
98. J. GOODALE, supra note 88, at 6-35.
99. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76, 251(4)-(7) (1972).
100. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979) [Midwest Video 111. The
Court held that the Commission had overstepped its authority under the Communications
Act. Id. at 701. The Court refused to express a view regarding the first amendment
claims of cable operators except to note that such claims were "not frivolous." Id. at
708 n.19.
101. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2780
(1984) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (1988)). Section 531(a) provides
that the franchising authority "may establish requirements in a franchise with respect to
the designation or use of channel capacity for public, educational or governmental use
." Section 531(e) provides that the cable operator shall not exercise any editorial
control over the access channels.
102. City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494
(1986).
103. Id. at 496 (the Court remanded the case to the district court for a trial on the
merits of the cable operator's first amendment claims; it remains in litigation as of
publication).
104. Decisions favoring the ability of government franchising authorities to require
cable public access channels include: Chicago Cable Communications v. Chicago Cable
Comm'n, 678 F. Supp. 734 (N.D. IU. 1988), aff'd, 879 F.2d 1540 (7th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 839 (1990); Erie Telecommunications, Inc. v. City of Erie, 659 F.
Supp. 580 (W.D. Pa. 1987), aff'd, 853 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1988); Berkshire Cablevision
of R.I. v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976 (D.R.I. 1983). Decisions favoring the superiority
272 JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS [Vol. VIII
The unsettled state of the law derives in part from the difficulty
of analogizing cable television to more traditional forms of media."0 5
Some courts and commentators have termed cable television an "electronic
newspaper" 101 and, in so doing, have invoked established precedent that
forbids government from establishing a right of citizen access to
newspapers.107 Other courts and commentators have stressed certain
similarities between cable and broadcasting," s thereby relying on well-
settled law that permits government regulation of broadcasting in the
"public interest."" While the Supreme Court has held, in a different
context, that "each medium of expression must be assessed by the
standards properly suited to it,"110 the Court has so far offered scant
guidance as to what standards are properly suited for cable television."1
of a cable operator's first amendment rights include: Group W Cable, Inc. v. City of
Santa Cruz, 669 F. Supp. 954 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Century Fed., Inc. v. City of Palo
Alto, Cal., 648 F. Supp. 1465 (N.D. Cal. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1053 (1988);
Quincy Cable v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Midwest Video v. FCC, 571
F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978). These latter decisions tend to rely heavily on the Supreme
Court's holding in Miami Herald Publishing v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). For a
discussion of Tornillo and its inapplicability to cable public access, see infra note 107.
105. See infra text accompanying notes 106-23.
106. See, e.g., Midwest Video, 571 F.2d at 1056; see also Note, Access to Cable
Natural Monopoly and the First Amendment, 86 COLuM. L. REv. 1663, 1666 (1986).
107. In Tornillo, the Supreme Court struck down a Florida statute that required
newspapers to publish replies to personal attacks. 418 U.S. at 258. The denial of a
public right of access to newspapers can be properly distinguished from cable public
access. In Tornillo, the statute mandating access to newspapers was deemed invalid
because not only would the newspaper have to print what reason told them not to print,
but the right of reply would chill the editors' own expression. Id. at 257. As the House
Report accompanying the Cable Commission Policy Act makes clear, mandatory cable
public access "does not chill the cable operators' speech [because] the right of access is
not contingent on what the cable operator states. It works automatically and without
extensive government intervention." H.R. Rep. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3,
reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4655, 4671-72.
108. See, e.g., United States v. Midwest Video, 406 U.S. 649 (1972) [Midwest
Video I] (the Court held that the jurisdiction of the FCC over cable was "reasonably
ancillary" to its regulation of broadcasting).
109. The public interest standard is enshrined in the Communications Act of 1934,
47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1988). The Supreme Court upheld this regulatory scheme in Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
110. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981) (striking
down an ordinance that severely restricted outdoor advertising).
111. See infra text accompanying notes 112-23.
As might be expected, this lack of guidance has led inexorably to
a growing conflict among the federal circuit courts. The Third112 and
Seventh"' Circuits expressly or impliedly have favored the first
amendment rights of cable access users over the corresponding rights of
cable operators. Conversely, the Ninth 14 and District of Columbia1 5
Circuits have elevated the rights of cable operators over both the rights of
access users and the government's ability to require or enforce the users'
rights.1 6 Thus it remains for the Supreme Court to provide some
much-needed clarity as to precisely whose first amendment rights are
superior.
Some commentators have suggested an appealing solution to this
conundrum. They recommend an "unbundling" of cable programming
into functional classifications such as original programming, distribution
of programming produced by others and public access.117  The cable
operator's original programming would enjoy traditional first amendment
protections; the cable access user would enjoy similar protections."1
Implicit in this approach, of course, is a recognition that the cable
operator's first amendment rights are coterminus with, and not superior
to, the access user's rights. 9 An additional constitutional argument in
defense of cable public access is that such access constitutes a public
forum and that the regulation or abolition of a public forum, in certain
112. Erie Telecommunications, Inc. v. City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1988)
(affirming on other grounds the district court's holding that fees associated with cable
public access are constitutional).
113. Chicago Cable Communications v. Chicago Cable Comm'n, 879 F.2d 1540
(7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 839 (1990) (holding that a franchise provision
requiring local origination of certain cable television programs does not violate the first
amendment).
114. Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396 (9th
Cir. 1986) (holding that a cable operator enjoys first amendment protection and striking
down city's system of awarding exclusive cable franchises).
115. Quincy Cable v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that a cable
operator enjoys first amendment protection and striking down an FCC regulation
requiring operators to carry certain over-the-air television broadcast signals transmitted
in the locality).
116. See, e.g., Quincy 768 F.2d at 1454-59; Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d
at 1403-09.
117. LeDuc, Unbundling the Channels: A Functional Approach to Cable TV
Analysis, 41 FED. CoMM. L.J. 1, 3-4 (1988); Brenner, Cable Television and the
Freedom of Expression, 1988 DuKE L.J. 329, 336-38.
118. LeDuc, supra note 117, at 10-11.
119. Id. at 12-13.
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circumstances, may be subject to strict judicial scrutiny. 120 Such an
argument, espoused by a commentator in the early 1980's,121 has
recently gained its first judicial recognition. 2 Moreover, the
application of public forum doctrine may prove to be of increasing
importance not only to buttress the constitutional defense of the continuing
existence of cable public access but also, assuming such continuing
existence, to minimize government regulation of content and viewpoint
communicated over cable public access."
C. Cable Public Access as a Public Forum
The time has come to update the public forum doctrine to
the television age. The power of audio-visual
communication to captivate human thought is evident.
Few Americans have watched television and not felt its
electric touch. . . . Use of the streets and parks for
expression without the assistance of telecommunications
facilities is only partially effective and does not
adequately serve the goals of the First Amendment. If
society is to attain those goals through television, it
cannot rely solely on the commercial media. Rather
channels should be opened for public use; the screen
must become the modern town square. .... 12
This clarion call for judicial recognition of cable public access
channels as a public forum has received recognition by other
commentators.'15 Yet the importance of this constitutional question is
120. See infra text and accompanying notes 183-88.
121. Mininberg, supra note 96, at 596-97.
122. Missouri Knights v. Kansas City, 723 F. Supp. 1347 (W.D. Mo. 1989).
123. This matter is discussed at greater length in SECTION IIC, infra notes 124-61.
It is beyond the scope of this note to discuss government regulation of obscenity and
indecency and the application of such regulation to cable public access. For an
illuminating discussion of this subject, see Winer, The Signal Cable Carries -
Interference from the Indecency Cases, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 459 (1987).
124. Mininberg, supra note 96, at 595-96.
125. See, e.g., Caristi, supra note 96, at 118-25; Wirth & Cobb-Reiley, A First
Amendment Critique of the 1984 Cable Act, 31 J. BROADCASTING & ELEC. MEDIA 391,
403 (1987); see also The House Report accompanying the Cable Communications Policy
Act, H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADmiN. NEWS 4655, 4667. "Public access channels are often the video equivalent to
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perhaps better understood outside the United States, where the link
between freedom of expression and telecommunications is more
immediately obvious." One constitutional scholar, who is expected to
assist in the drafting of new constitutions for certain Eastern European
nations, has stated: "For [these] countries, the most important aspect to
the right of free speech will be access to television.""
The argument in 'favor of judicial designation of cable public
access channels as public fora begins with the simple recognition that
cable uses the public right-of-way and such use is integral to its means of
expression. 2 The fact that the cable itself is owned by a private pany
is not necessarily dispositive. ' 9 Rather the inquiry is whether the
property is controlled by government" and whether the property has
been dedicated to public use.' Cable public access satisfies the first
test in that government exercises a considerable degree of control over a
cable operator through the franchising authority.3 2 Cable public access
satisfies the second test as a matter of law.13
3
It is important to distinguish between cable and broadcasting in
order to understand why the latter has never been deemed to be a public
the speaker's soapbox or the electronic parallel to the printed leaflet. They provide
groups and individuals who generally have not had access to the electronic media with
the opportunity to become sources of information in the electronic marketplace of ideas."
Id.
126. Wiehl, Constitution Anyone? A New Cottage Industry, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2,
1990, at B6, col. 3.
127. Id.
128. Note, Cable Television Rights of Way: Technology Expands the Concept of
Public Forum, 20:4 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1293 (1987).
129. If government authorizes a private party to construct and maintain a speaker's
platform on a public street for public use, there would be no doubt that the platform
would constitute a public forum; the fact that cable public access makes a different use
of the street than the speaker's platform should make no difference in the result. See,
e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975); Caristi, supra note
96, at 120.
130. Missouri Knights v. Kansas City, 723 F. Supp. 1347, 1351 (W.D. Mo. 1989).
131. Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983);
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Madison School Dist. v. Wisconsin Employee
Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
132. Missouri Knights, 723 F. Supp. at 1351.
133. That cable public access is "dedicated to public use" is made clear in the
express language of franchise agreements authorizing public access and by the Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 531 (1988), in which Congress
authorizes franchising authorities to designate channel capacity for public use.
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forum despite the fact that the electromagnetic spectrum lies in the public
domain." 4  The Supreme Court's analysis in Columbia
Broadcasting,13 in which the Court held that there was no public right
of access to broadcasting, " provides a basis for identifying the
significant distinctions between cable and broadcasting. First, the Court
in Columbia Broadcasting accorded great weight to the judgment of
Congress,"' which had elected not to establish a statutory right of
access to broadcasting."' Second, the Court noted the broadcasting
regulatory scheme known as the Fairness Doctrine which, among other
things, placed an affirmative obligation on broadcasters to cover public
issues in a way that fairly reflects differing viewpoints.' 39 Finally and
most importantly, the Court noted that each broadcast station would find
it "physically impossible" to provide for all viewpoints." Put another
way, public access would probably sacrifice too much of the broadcaster's
air time, which is limited to 148 hours per week.14 ' As one
commentator has noted, the physical impossibility argument loses much
of its force when applied to the medium of cable television, where a
single cable operator of a seventy-channel system may carry over 10,000
program hours per week. 42 In the circumstances, it would be difficult
to argue that dedication of two channels (300 weekly program hours) out
of the seventy for public access would seriously impair the cable
134. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
101 (1973).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 121.
137. Id. at 102-03.
138. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1988). By contrast, Congress has expressly permitted
cable franchising authorities to require the allocation of one or more channels for public
access. 47 U.S.C. § 531 (1988).
139. The Fairness Doctrine was later revoked by action of the Federal
Communications Commission, 2 F.C.C. 5057. The revocation was appealed to the
District of Columbia Circuit and upheld. See Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d
654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 717 (1990). No such affirmative
obligation currently is applied to cable operators. As a result of the Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984, the Federal Communication Commission lacks
jurisdiction over cable operators with respect to almost all substantive matters, including
the statutory underpinnings of the fairness doctrine. 47 U.S.C. § 542(i) (1988).
140. Columbia Broadcasting, 412 U.S. at 111.
141. Mininberg, supra note 96, at 596.
142. A cable operator with a 50 channel system would have approximately 8,400
hours of potential program time per week. Id. at 596-97.
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operator's financial or editorial integrity."
In sum, cable public access is a public forum because government
has elected to treat it as a public forum and because it may be argued that
there are no constitutional infirmities deriving from government favoring
the first amendment rights of access users over the first amendment rights
of cable operators. " This recognition, however, does not end the
analysis. The Supreme Court has identified two types of public fora, each
with their own distinguishing characteristics.t The question of
classifying cable public access as to type of forum is of some importance,
as this classification will determine the degree to which cable public
access is subject to government regulation."
A traditional public forum consists generally of publicly owned
or controlled property that is associated with use by the public for
expressive activity.' Although public streets and parks are most
closely identified as traditional public fora, the designation also has been
extended to places such as airport terminals. 1"' The Supreme Court has
held that such public fora, once established, must continue to be
maintained for communicative purposes; 4 9 their elimination "is at least
presumptively impermissible. " "
A limited or designated public forum is distinguished from a
traditional public forum in that government need not maintain the open
character of the place."' If, however, the government maintains the
open character of the forum, it may not exclude communication based
upon content absent a compelling state interest and government may not
enforce regulations of time, place and manner of expression unless such
regulations are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest and leave open ample alternative channels of
143. Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4655, 4673.
144. As noted earlier, however, this question is far from settled. See supra text
accompanying notes 96-123.
145. See infra text accompanying notes 147-155.
146. See infra text accompanying notes 159-61.
147. The public forum doctrine was first set forth by the Supreme Court in Hague
v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 514 (1939); see also Shuttleworth v. City of Birmingham, 394
U.S. 147 (1969); Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Edwards v. South Carolina,
372 U.S. 229 (1963).
148. Jamison v. City of St. Louis, 828 F.2d 1280 (1987).
149. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
150. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983).
151. See, e.g., Perry, 460 U.S. at 37, 45-46; Widmar 454 U.S. at 268.
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communication. 2 Examples of this type of forum include university
meeting facilities,' 3  school board meetings" and city-owned
theaters. '55
While no court has held that cable public access is a traditional
public forum, such a holding might not be inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's line of authority defining the traditional public forum as "places
which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to
assembly and debate."" On another occasion the Court defined the
traditional public forum as one "held in trust either by tradition or by
recent convention for the use of the citizens at large.' 57  Thus, cable
public access, while by no means traditional, nevertheless seems to
possess many of the key attributes of the traditional public forum.' 58
If a court were to hold that cable public access constitutes a
traditional public forum, then the elimination of a cable public access
channel would be "at least presumptively impermissible."' 59  Such a
holding would provide cable public access with a strong constitutional
foundation by which to withstand attack from cable operators, government
franchising authorities and other units of government. Alternatively, a
holding that cable public access constitutes a limited public forum would
provide a somewhat less solid foundation (in that government is
substantially unrestrained from eliminating the limited public forum)."
Nevertheless, even this alternative holding would provide cable public
access with a strong measure of protection with respect to government
regulation of content and viewpoint communicated over cable public
152. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,293
(1984); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 648
(1981).
153. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 265.
154. Madison School Dist. v. Wisconsin Employee Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S.
167 (1976).
155. Southeastern Promotions, Inc. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
156. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (emphasis added).
157. Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 815 n.32
(1984) (emphasis added).
158. That cable public access is dedicated to public use by recent convention is
made clear in the express language of franchise agreements authorizing public access and
by The Cable Communications Policy Act § 611, 47 U.S.C. § 531 (1988), in which
Congress authorizes franchising authorities to designate channel capacity for public use.
159. Grace, 461 U.S. at 180.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 151-155.
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D. Government Regulation of Content and Viewpoint
Communicated Over Cable Television Public Access
Channels: Missouri Knights v. Kansas City
A recent opinion by the United States District Court for the
Western District of Missouri represents the first judicial recognition of
cable public access as a public forum. In Missouri Knights of the Ku Klux
Klan v. Kansas City, Missouri,12 the court issued a memorandum
decision denying defendant Kansas City's motion to dismiss in part
because the plaintiff had adequately alleged that the public access channel
had become a public forum." The court also held that the plaintiff's
contention that the public access channel was eliminated in order to censor
plaintiff's viewpoint was a cognizable first amendment's and statutory
claim. " While the court's analysis of these issues was without benefit
of trial and carries no technical precedential authority," the opinion
nevertheless breaks new ground and is certain to be looked to by other
courts deciding similar cases.
The case arose when the politically extremist Missouri Knights
sought access to the local public access channel. 67 Under the terms of
a franchise agreement between Kansas City and American Cablevision
(ACV), a public access channel was available to anyone on a first-come,
161. For example, elimination of the public access channel probably would be
subject to scrutiny under the time, place and manner restrictions. See infra text
accompanying note 152. In addition, such elimination, if accompanied by a cognizable
legislative purpose to discriminate with respect to content or viewpoint, would be subject
to heightened scrutiny. See infra text accompanying notes 149-55.
162. 723 F. Supp. 1347 (W.D. Mo. 1989).
163. Id. at 1352.
164. Id. at 1353.
165. Id. at 1354.
166. Id. at 1348.
167. Some commentators have drawn a parallel between this case and the litigation
arising from the celebrated Skokie cases, which also involved a politically extremist
group. See Colin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978). Both cases have as their
subject an unpopular group desiring to air its message of bigotry. However, for the two
cases to be "truly parallel, it would have been necessary for the people of Skokie to dig
up the streets to destroy the forum." Roberts, ACLU Readies Suit to Defend Klan's Free
Speech Rights, L.A. Daily J., Dec. 8, 1988 at 1, col. 2 (quoting Professor Perry of New
York Law School).
1990] NOTES 279
JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS
first-serve basis. " ACV was required to provide public access users
with equipment, facilities and staff assistance free of charge. 16
9
The Kansas City City Council then adopted an ACV proposal to
abolish the public access channel and replace it with a "community
programming channel" over which ACV would exercise full editorial
control."O The apparent purpose of the elimination was to prevent the
Missouri Knights from cablecasting their programming because of their
viewpoint. 7'
In defense of its action, Kansas City contended that the public
access channel was not a public forum since the channel was not owned
by the government. " Even assuming arguendo that the channel was a
public forum, defendant would at most concede that it might be a
designated public forum,"7 and that the government was under no duty
to maintain indefinitely this type of forum. 74 In other words, Kansas
City's decision to eliminate the public access channel did not create a
claim under the first amendment. 75
In its memorandum accompanying its order denying defendant's
motion to dismiss, the court held that the plaintiff had adequately alleged
that the public access channel was a public forum. 176  Although the
government did not own the public access channel, it exercised a
sufficient degree of control over the channel to satisfy the requirements
of the Supreme Court's public forum jurisprudence.' 77 The court then
assumed for the sake of argument that the public access channel was a
designated rather than traditional public forum,7 7 and accepted
defendant's contention that government has no obligation to maintain
168. Missouri Knights, 723 F. Supp. at 1349.
169. Id.
170. Roberts, supra note 167, at 1.
171. Id. Apparently the Missouri Knights were the primary, although not the
exclusive, motivation for the action by the Kansas City City Council that eliminated the
public access channel. According to Kansas City City Attorney Richard Ward,"there
was a lot of 'garbage' on the public access channel." Marcotte, Klan Cable Suit,
A.B.A. J., May 1989, at 38, 39.
172. Reply Brief for Kansas City at 30-31, Missouri Knights v. Kansas City, 723
F. Supp. 1347 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (No. 89-0067-CV-W-5).
173. Id. at 32.
174. Id. at 33-34.
175. Id. at 42-44.
176. Missouri Knights, 723 F. Supp. at 1351-52.
177. Id. at 1351.
178. Id. at 1352.
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indefinitely a designated public forum." 9  Yet, while accepting this
thread of the defendant's argument, the court reached a different result:
The Constitution forbids a state to enforce exclusions
from a forum generally open to the public even if it was
not required to create the forum in the first place.
Whether the exclusion is accomplished by individual
censorship or elimination of the forum is inconsequential;
the result is the same. A state may only eliminate a
designated public forum if it does so in a manner
consistent with the first amendment. The complaint
alleges Channel 20 was eliminated to censor the
viewpoint of the Missouri Knights. At this stage of the
proceedings, that is sufficient.1 0
This judicial construction, if adopted by other courts, could provide a
significant bulwark against future government attempts to eliminate public
access channels for reasons associated with censorship. "I
The court further held that, even if the City were to prove at trial
that its decision to eliminate the public access channel was without
reference to the viewpoint of the plaintiffs or other parties, the City's
action would still be subject to review under the content-neutral
restrictions set forth in United States v. O'Brien."*  In O'Brien the
Supreme Court held that a government restriction on expressive conduct
is valid only if it is within the constitutional power of the government; if
it furthers an important or substantial government interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
and if the incidental restriction on alleged first amendment freedoms is no
179. Id.
180. Id. (citations omitted). The court did not provide authority for this principle.
It apparently relied on the statement of this principle in the plaintiff's brief, which did
cite as authority several Supreme Court cases involving termination of school employees
in apparent retaliation for the exercising of free speech. Brief for Plaintiff at 21-22 n.8,
Missouri Knights v. Kansas City, 723 F. Supp. 1347 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (No. 89-0067-
CV-W-5) (citing Mount Healthy School Bd. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977); Elrod v.
Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976)).
181. This construction seemingly accords public access channels the same level of
protection from censorship as that enjoyed by traditional public fora, i.e., elimination
is presumptively impermissible. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
182. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
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greater than essential to the furtherance of that interest. "
Unfortunately, the court's reliance on the O'Brien test is
technically incorrect. The validity of restrictions on the time, place and
manner of protected speech is governed by the different standards posited
in Virginia Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.lu and
elsewhere. 5  These standards require only that content-neutral
regulations of protected speech are narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest and leave open ample alternative channels of
communications." On their face these standards would appear to be
somewhat less speech protective than those of O'Brien."r Nevertheless,
it could be expected that if the time, place and manner standards were
applied in a case involving government elimination of a cable public
access channel, government would bear a considerable burden in showing
that its actions were "narrowly tailored" and "left open ample alternative
channels of communication. " 1
Moving beyond the plaintiff's first amendment claims, the court
considered in Missouri Knights whether plaintiffs may pursue a cause of
action under Section 611 of the Cable Communications Policy Act.'"
In their brief, plaintiffs had argued in the alternative that the newly-
created "community programming channel" over which Kansas City has
permitted ACV to exercise editorial control was, in fact, a public access
channel and therefore Kansas City was in violation of Section 611(e) of
the Act." ° Kansas City stated in its reply that the Act does not provide
183. Id.
184. 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976).
185. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,293
(1984); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983); Heffron v. International Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981).
186. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771.
187. The "narrowly tailored" standard appears less speech-protective than O'Brien's
"no greater than essential" standard. In Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746,
2757-58 (1989), the Supreme Court upheld a content-neutral speech regulation using the
narrowly tailored standard, while the court below had overturned the same regulation
using the O'Brien standard.
188. For example, the government might have to show that the parks and streets
constituted ample alternative means of communication for groups that had previously
relied on cable public access.
189. Missouri Knights, 723 F. Supp. at 1354.
190. Brief for Plaintiff at 39-44, Missouri Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kansas
City, Mo., 723 F. Supp. 1347 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (No. 89-0067-CV-W-5).
[Vol. VIII
1990] NOTES 283
for a private right of action to enforce this provision.191 The plaintiffs
invoked 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which expressly provides "[e]very person who,
under color of any statute... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen.. .to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and the laws, shall be liable to the party injured in any
action at law, [or] suit in equity."'" The court agreed with the
plaintiffs that section 611 of the Act created substantive rights enforceable
under section 198 3 ."
In response to these findings of law that appeared highly favorable
to the plaintiffs' position, defendant Kansas City agreed to settle the
lawsuit and restore the access channel. 19
E. Strengthening Cable Public Access Through
Statutory Reform
Section III of this Note has been so far concerned exclusively with
constitutional questions implicated by cable public access. Any discussion
of this subject would not be complete without some review of proposed
reform of the legislative provisions which quite recently established a
federal statutory underpinning for cable public access. 95 Modification
of these provisions may prove instrumental in strengthening the reach and
effectiveness of cable public access, and the opportunity for such
modification may present itself in the near future."
As of this writing, Congress appears receptive to overhauling the
1984 Cable Act."9 The impetus for the new legislation is reported to
191. Suggestions in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 39-42, Missouri
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kansas City, Mo., 723 F. Supp. 1347 (W.D. Mo. 1989)
(No. 89-0067-CV-W-5).
192. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
193. Missouri Knights, 723 F. Supp. at 1354.
194. See KKK-KC Controversy, BROADCASTING, July 31, 1989, at 51. In a move
that will prove far more harmonious with the first amendment than wholesale elimination
of the public access channel, ACV planned to offer lock-out devices at cost to
subscribers who elect not to receive the new access channel.
195. See, e.g., Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549,
98 Stat. 2780 (1984) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (1988)).
196. See infra notes 197-210 and accompanying text.
197. At least 12 cable re-regulation bills were introduced in the 101st Congress.
Pasdeloup, Danforth Gains Broad Backing for Cable Reregulalion Measure,
CABLEWORLD, Nov. 20, 1989, at 1, 21. In September 1990, the House approved a
cable re-regulation bill by a unanimous margin. Nash, House Passes a Bill to Regulate
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be strong constituent pressure for some form of cable rate regulation and
widespread dissatisfaction with cable service.1 ' Observers are
forecasting the passage of some form of cable legislation over the next
two years.'"
The strong possibility of new cable legislation represents an
opportunity for the further strengthening of cable public access.' A
national public access advocacy group, the National Federation of Local
Cable Programmers (NFLCP), testified before the Senate Subcommittee
on Communications in November 1989 and put forth a series of
recommendations to preserve and expand cable public access.2 1 The
NFLCP recommendations provide a blueprint for statutory reform and are
summarized herein.
The 1984 Cable Act permits, but does not require, local
franchising authorities to mandate public access.2 NFLCP
Cable T.V. in Part, N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1990, at Al, col. 1. The Senate, however,
failed to approve a companion bill before the close of the 101st Congress. Blumel, Gore
Promises 'New, Tough Bill' Next Year, CABLE T.V. Bus., Nov. 15, 1990, at 33. One
of the Senate bill's sponsors predicted an even tougher re-regulation bill would be
introduced in Congress in 1991. Id. at 34.
198. Demise of Dereg?, CABLE TV L. REP., Nov. 21, 1989, at 1.
199. Pasdeloup, supra note 197.
200. Legislative action designed to aid cable public access cannot, of course, cure
its alleged constitutional infirmities. Continuing congressional support for public access,
however, could influence judicial treatment of the constitutional issues. The Supreme
Court explicitly acknowledges such influence in this passage from a key constitutional
case involving mass media:
The judgment of the Legislative Branch cannot be ignored
or undervalued simply because one segment of the
broadcast constituency casts its claims under the umbrella
of the First Amendment. This is not to say we "defer" to
the judgment of the Congress . . . on a constitutional
question .... The point is, rather, that when we face a
complex problem with many hard questions and few easy
answers, we do well to pay careful attention to how the
other branches of Government have addressed the same
problem.
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 103
(1973).
201. Oversight of Cable TV: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Communications
of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
464 (1989) (statement of Sharon B. Ingraham, Chairperson, National Federation of Local
Cable Programmers) [hereinafter Oversight of Cable TV.
202. 47 U.S.C. § 531(a) (1988).
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recommends that section 531 be modified to ensure that access is available
in all cabled communities.' Such a bold step, if enacted by Congress,
would remove much doubt as to whether cable public access constitutes
a public forum on a par with public streets and parks.
The Cable Act does not distinguish between channels set aside for
public, educational and governmental use.' As a result, one city
during franchise renewal negotiations relied on the Act's ambiguity to
substitute governmental access for an existing public access channel.' 5
NFLCP recommends that Section 531 be modified to require that channels
set aside for access be available to all individuals and groups in a
community."
Beyond securing the future existence of cable public access,
NFLCP also urges a provision which will ensure adequate operating funds
for the access facility. 7  Under present law, local franchising
authorities need not expend franchise fees on public access or even cable-
related purposes. 8 Adequate funding for public access can be secured
either by a requirement that a portion of the franchise fee be set aside for
access purposes or by permitting franchising authorities to require cable
operators to fund public access."
Finally, in the event that Congress elects to re-regulate cable rates
and establish low-cost "lifeline" tiers, NFLCP recommends that public
access be made a part of such "lifeline" services.210
IV. CONCLUSION
It may be appropriate on the occasion of the 200th anniversary of
the first amendment to take stock. Only sixty years ago the Supreme
Court announced that the first amendment was applicable to the
203. Oversight of Cable TV, supra note 201, at 320-21.
204. See 47 U.S.C. § 531 (the terms "public," "educational," and "governmental"
are not defined in the statute).
205. St. Petersburg, Florida, replaced a public access channel with a governmental
access channel. Oversight of Cable TV, supra note 201, at 313.
206. See id. at 322 (where the NFLCP states that it is a flawed policy to reserve
access for select groups).
207. Id. at 321.
208. See 47 U.S.C. § 542 (1988).
209. Oversight of Cable TV, supra note 201, at 321.
210. Id.
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211states, only fifty years ago the Court "discovered" the public
forum,1 2 only twenty years ago the Court validated the regulatory
scheme governing broadcasting 23 and less than twenty years ago the
Court recognized some limited privilege for newsgathering.21 4 In these
circumstances it would appear that the essential viability of the first
amendment may be found in its elasticity.
This Note has surveyed a broad swath of first amendment
jurisprudence and attempted to identify certain issues that will need to be
further addressed as the technology of electronic mass media continues to
advance. In the face of these advances well-established doctrine
governing control of mass media has begun to show signs of functional
obsolescence. 13 Sooner or later such obsolescence will become the
subject of litigation and the courts -- especially the Supreme Court -- will
play an important role in reformulating the regulatory schemes governing
mass media. In playing this role courts should occasionally look beyond
narrow case law precedent and reach for the underlying principles that
animated the first amendment jurisprudence of Justices Holmes and
Brandeis. 2 6  With respect to the emerging issues of non-professional
video production and distribution that are the subject of this note, it is
hoped that courts will return once again to the bedrock principle that the
first amendment "rests on the assumption that the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is
essential to the welfare of the public."2 17
The growth in non-professional video production and the corollary
growth in non-professional and freelance video newsgathering suggest that
courts and legislatures may have to re-examine the legal definition of
"journalist" and the nature and extent of special privileges accorded those
who satisfy this definition. At a minimum those denied "press passes"
should be accorded basic due process rights with respect to the reason for
211. Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
212. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
213. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
214. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
215. See, e.g., Federal Communications Commission, 2 F.C.C. 5057 (the fairness
doctrine, a bulwark of broadcast regulation, was revoked by action of the FCC).
216. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis and
Holmes, JJ., concurring) ("[The] freedom to ... speak ... [is a] means indispensable
to the discovery and spread of political truth; . . . that public discussion is a political
duty ...... ); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) ("Mhe ultimate good is better reached by the free trade in ideas .
217. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
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the denial and the opportunity for judicial review. Beyond establishing
due process standards, courts may need to reconsider the continuing
validity of restrictive definitions of "journalist" with respect to
government-authorized access to emergency scenes and non-public forum
government property. Courts may also have reason to extend the
newsgatherer's non-disclosure privilege to freelancers and non-
professionals in particular cases.
Although cable public access presents an entirely different setting
and a more complex interplay of conflicting interests, the underlying first
amendment principles remain the same. The drafters of the 1984 Cable
Act" may not have fully realized the implications of establishing
federal authority for an "electronic public forum." Once established,
however, this new type of public forum, in a great many circumstances,
may prove difficult to abolish, as the decision in Missouri Knights"9 has
already shown. Whether or not streets and parks allow "ample alternative
means of communication" to cable public access is a question that one
hopes courts will subject to a high level of scrutiny.'
It was earlier noted that, for many of the newly democratizing
Eastern European nations, "the most important aspect to the right of free
speech will be access to television."" It would be indeed ironic if the
nation that gave birth to the first amendment fails to reach the same
conclusion.
Steven Siegel
218. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-548, 98 Stat. 2780
(codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (1988)).
219. 723 F. Supp. 1347 (W.D. Mo. 1989).
220. The district court in Missouri Knights adhered to this standard of review. See
supra notes 184-88 and accompanying text.
221. Wiehl, Constitution, Anyone?, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1990, at B6, col. 3.

